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This paper examines how  insurance companies participating in delivery of  crop 
insurance would change patterns of  portfolio allocation across reinsurance funds in 
reaction to the 2005 Standard Reinsurance Agreement. The returns of  insurance 
companies under the SRA are calculated using a simulation model. An  heuristic 
allocation rule is introduced in order to imitate portfolio allocation strategies of 
participating companies. The main conclusion of  the analysis is that the bulk of 
changes in portfolio allocations are likely  to be  caused by  the introduction of 
"retained net book quota share" reinsurance rather than adjustments in the cession 
limits and retention requirements for the Assigned Risk Fund. 
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Introduction 
An integral feature of the federal crop insurance program is the Standard Reinsurance 
Agreement (SRA) between the U.S. government and the private insurance companies 
that deliver yield and revenue insurance to crop producers [U.S. Department of 
Agriculture/Risk Management Agency (USDAIRMA), 1997, 20041. Risk sharing is a 
unique aspect of the federal crop insurance program that distinguishes it from other 
federally backed  programs such as flood  insurance, where the federal government 
assumes all underwriting risks. Through the SRA, crop insurance companies share 
underwriting risks in exchange for  a  share of  potential underwriting profits.  The 
reinsurance provisions of the SRA allow companies to decrease their risk exposure by 
transferring (ceding) some liability to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) 
and selectively allocating the remaining (retained) portions of their portfolios among 
several reinsurance funds. 
The ability  of  companies to place policies  into separate reinsurance funds with 
distinct risk-sharing characteristics (Ker and McGowan, 2000) is an  important feature 
of the  SRA. Under the SRA, if a private company chooses to  write crop insurance policies 
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in a state, it must offer crop insurance products to any farmer in that state. Moreover, 
insurance companies must accept the premium rates and underwriting  guidelines 
established by the Risk Management Agency, which administers crop insurance and 
reinsurance programs on behalf of the FCIC. Thus, crop insurance companies may face 
large potential risk exposure without recourse to raising premium rates or declining to 
offer coverage to high-risk individuals. Therefore, the SRA allows companies to place 
high-risk business in the Assigned Risk Fund where the government assumes most of 
the risk. Less risky business, on the other hand, can be placed in funds where companies 
pay more of  the underwriting losses but also keep more of  the underwriting gains. 
Underwriting returns thus are related to how well a company classifies its risks and 
manages its portfolio.' 
In  2004, a new SRA was negotiated and went into effect for the 2005 reinsurance year 
(which began on July 1,2004).  It replaced the previous SRA, which was adopted for the 
1998 reinsurance year and renewed virtually unchanged in subsequent years. The bulk 
of  differences between the new (2005 SRA) and previous (1998 SRA) versions of  the 
Agreement mostly affect companies' ability to allocate business to the Assigned Risk 
Fund (see discussion below). Other provisions of the SRA, in particular shares of gains 
kept and losses borne by the companies, remained unchanged (USDA/RMA, 1997,2004). 
As of  the time of  this writing, no data were available on actuarial performance of the 
crop insurance programs under the new SRA. However, one can assume that the most 
direct effect of  the new  agreement would  be different  allocation of  crop insurance 
portfolios among reinsurance funds. The purpose of the current study is to model such 
potential changes in the portfolio allocation that may be implemented by  insurance 
companies in response to the new SRA. 
The federal crop insurance program has been extensively discussed in the literature 
(Kramer, 1983; Gardner, 1994; Goodwin and Smith, 1995; Glauber and Collins, 2002; 
Glauber, 2004). However, the analysis of portfolio allocation under the SRA has received 
little attention. Ker and McGowan (2000) used a stylized model of the SRA to demon- 
strate that companies could adversely select against the FCIC by ceding more risk in 
years with ex ante projections of yield shortfalls, but their empirical analysis was limited 
to wheat production in 57 Texas counties. Ker and Ergiin (2004) searched for empirical 
evidence that policy allocations by insurance companies reveal private information avail- 
able to the companies. In particular, they found the policies placed in the Commercial 
Fund are more likely to be profitable, while those placed in the Assigned Risk Fund are 
less likely to be profitable. However, they do not discuss possible allocation strategies 
the companies may use. 
In this study, we take a slightly different approach to the analysis of portfolio alloca- 
tion. Instead of an econometric model, the paper builds on the recent work of Vedenov 
et al. (2004) who construct an SRA simulation model based on historical yield data and 
composition of crop insurance portfolios of individual companies. Using a similar model, 
we examine the allocation patterns present in the portfolios of insurance companies that 
participated in delivery of  crop insurance products in the base year (2001). We then 
attempt to model companies' allocation decision-making process by introducing a simple 
Company's profitability here is restricted to underwriting profits and does not explicitly examine administrative and 
operating (A&O) expenses. Under the SRA,  A&O expenses are subsidized by the government at a fixed percentage of 
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heuristic rule. The latter dictates allocation decisions based on the historical loss ratios 
for each crop reporting district and crop. 
The efficiency of the suggested allocation  rule in replicating companies' returns is  first 
evaluated by comparing heuristic allocation generated under the 1998 SRA with the 
actual allocation for the base year (2001). The rule is then used to generate heuristic 
portfolio allocations under the 2005 SRA. The changes in the allocation patterns are 
analyzed at  the company and state levels. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows. First, an overview of the Standard 
Reinsurance Agreement is presented, highlighting differences between the 1998 and 
2005 SRAs. The SRA simulation model used in the analysis is then briefly described. 
The next section introduces the heuristic allocation rule and compares heuristic and 
actual allocations for the base year (2001).  This is followed by a presentation of heuristic 
portfolio  allocation generated  under the new  SRA  and a discussion of  changes in 
allocation patterns between the 1998 and 2005 SRAs. Concluding remarks are offered 
in the final section. 
The Standard Reinsurance Agreement 
This section presents a general overview of the Standard Reinsurance Agreement and 
a summary of changes between the 1998 and 2005 SRAs, particularly as they relate to 
the portfolio allocation decisions. Additional discussion and information on the SRA can 
be found in Ker (2001); Ker and Ergiin (2004);  Vedenov et al. (2004); and USDAIRMA 
(1997,2004). 
Portfolio allocation under the SRA is a two-stage process. First, each contract may be 
allocated in one of three reinsurance funds-Assigned  Risk Fund, Developmental Fund, 
and Commercial Fund-which  differ by the degree of risk sharing between the insur- 
ance companies and FCIC. Second, each company has to decide on the proportions of 
premiums it wishes to retain within each reinsurance fund subject to the required 
minimum retention limits of individual funds. 
The ceded (i.e., not retained) portions of the book of business are completely written 
off from the companies' balances. The FCIC receives all the associated premiums and 
also assumes full responsibility for the associated underwriting losses on the ceded busi- 
The underwriting gains and profits on the retained portion of business are then 
shared between the companies and FCIC in the proportions determined by the SRA. 
The Assigned Risk Fund (ARF) has the lowest required retention rate of  all three 
funds as well as the lowest shares of  losses the companies must pay on the retained 
business. These provisions make ARF an attractive destination for the more risky 
business. In order to avoid concentration of  the whole book of  business in ARF, the 
maximum cession limits are established for each state. Under the  1998 SRA, the 
maximum cession limits ranged from 10% to 75% of  the book of  business in a given 
state. The required retention rate was set to 20% for all states. The 2005 SRA estab- 
lished maximum cession limits at 25%, 50%, or 75%, and adjusted required retention 
rates to 25%,  20%, and 15%,  respectively. The maximum cession limits and required 
Note that unlike the fund allocation decision, the premiums and liabilities are ceded as  a proportion of the entire fund 
rather than on an  individual contract basis. In other words, each company retains at  least some liability on every policy it 
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retention rates for the Assigned Risk Fund under both the 1998 and 2005 SRAs are 
summarized in table 1  by state. For example, under the 2005 SRA, a company under- 
writing in Iowa can place up to 25% of its book of business in the state in the ARF. The 
company then must cede 75% of  the premiums and liabilities associated with policies 
placed in the fund to FCIC and retain the remaining 25% on its balance. 
The Developmental Fund requires the companies to retain at  least 35% of the premi- 
ums as well as the associated liability. There is no limit on how much business can be 
allocated to the fund. Within the Developmental Fund, contracts are  further designated 
into a CAT Fund, Revenue Insurance Fund, or All Other Plans Fund, depending on the 
type of  insurance policies. The retention percentages for these three funds may differ 
across states, but cannot be lower than 35%.  A company may elect to retain more than 
35% of its premium and associated liabilities. In this case, the retention level can be 
chosen in 5% increments up to 100%.  The provisions of the Developmental Fund 
remained the same under the 2005 SRA as in the 1998 SRA. 
Finally, designation of  a contract to the Commercial Fund requires a company to 
retain at  least 50% of the liability and associated premiums. There is also no cession 
limit associated with the Commercial Fund. As with the Developmental Fund, the 
Commercial Fund is further subdivided into CAT, Revenue Insurance, and All Other 
Plans funds. A company may select a retention rate higher than 50% in 5% increments 
up to 100%. The 2005 SRA provisions of  the Commercial Fund also were unchanged 
from the 1998 SRA. 
The responsibilities  of  the companies for the underwriting losses as well as their 
shares of the underwriting gains from the retained business depend on the realizations 
of  loss ratios of  each company in a given state for a given reinsurance year.3 The 
schedules of  shares under different realizations of  the loss ratios are shown in table 2 
for all reinsurance funds. For each loss ratio range, the percentages in the tables apply 
to the fraction of each company's loss (gain) within that range. 
The general principle is that the higher the loss ratio above one (underwriting loss), 
the  higher the portion of losses assumed by the FCIC (up to 100%  of the portion of losses 
exceeding 500% of  the retained premiums). Conversely, the lower the loss ratio below 
one (underwriting gain), the higher the portion of  premiums kept by the FCIC. The 
degree of sharing is the highest for the Assigned Risk Fund and the lowest for the Com- 
mercial Fund. The shares of gains and losses remained the same under both the 1998 
and 2005 SRA. 
The 2005 SRA also added a "retained net book quota share" form of reinsurance which 
did not exist under the 1998 SRA. Under this provision, each company is required to 
cede to FCIC 5% of  its cumulative underwriting gain or loss. In other words, once all 
other provisions of the SRA are applied and each company calculates its net gain or loss 
(aggregated over all states and funds), this final amount is reduced by 5%, with FCIC 
receiving the difference. 
The SRA Simulation Model 
In order to examine the effect of portfolio allocation decisions on rates of return of 
participating companies, we use an SRA simulation model (implemented as a computer 
A loss ratio is defined as  indemnity paid divided by premium collected (including premium subsidies). Vedenov et al.  Portfolio Allocation Under the SRA  6 1 
Table 1. Maximum Cession Limits and Retention Requirements Under the 
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Table 2. Shares of Gains and Losses to Private Insurance Companies Under 
the 1998 and 2005 SRAs 
Loss RATIO  RANGE 
0.5  0.65  1.0  1.6  2.2 
Reinsurance Fund  < 0.5  to 0.65  to 1.0  to 1.6  to2.2  to 5.0  > 5.0 
Commercial  CAT  8.0%  50.0%  75.0%  50.0%  40.0%  17.0%  0.0% 
Revenue  11.0%  70.0%  94.0%  57.0%  43.0%  17.0%  0.0% 
All Other  11.0%  70.0%  94.0%  50.0%  40.0%  17.0%  0.0% 
Developmental  CAT  4.0%  30.0%  45.0%  25.0%  20.0%  11.0%  0.0% 
Revenue  6.0%  50.0%  60.0%  30.0%  22.5%  11.0%  0.0% 
AllOther  6.0%  50.0%  60.0%  25.0%  20.0%  11.0%  0.0% 
Assigned Risk  2.0%  9.0%  15.0%  5.0%  4.0%  2.0%  0.0% 
Source: USDA/RMA (1997,  pp. 12-14),  and USDA/RMA (2004,  pp. 12-14). 
Note: The shares reflect the portions of underwriting gains kept or underwriting losses borne by the insurance companies, 
with the remaining portions assumed by the FCIC. 
program). The model simulates the distribution of the rates of return from underwriting 
crop insurance by  combining historical data on yields and loss costs with base year 
(2001) data on companies' liabilities and premium rates.4  The simulation model treats 
provisions of the SRA as input parameters, and thus is equally applicable to analysis 
of both the 1998 and 2005 SRA. The following is a brief description of the model, with 
some technical details omitted due to space limitations. An expanded presentation can 
be found in Vedenov et al. (2004). 
The model covers six crops-barley,  corn, cotton, soybeans, grain sorghum, and winter 
wheatwhich  represent 0.6%, 29.1%, 9.0%, 19.0%, 1.4%,  and 9.0%, respectively, of the 
total FCIC liabilities in 2001. Modeled insurance products include Catastrophic Risk 
Protection, Actual Production History, Crop Revenue Coverage, Revenue  Assurance, and 
Income Protection contracts with all available coverage levels. These represent 10.3%, 
34.2%, 32.2%, 4.1%, and 0.9%, respectively, of  the total FCIC liabilities in 2001. 
Together, these combinations of crops and products encompass about 65% of the total 
2001 FCIC liabilities. The major portion of the remaining liabilities consists of specialty 
crops concentrated mainly in California and Florida. Outside of these two states, the 
proportion of 2001 liability covered by the model is about 75%. 
The model is based on the assumption that the historically observed loss costs from 
1981-2001 adequately represent distribution of  losses faced by insurance companies 
underwriting crop insurance. Historical loss costs at the crop reporting district level are 
available for 1981-2001  for selected yield contracts but only in aggregate, thus providing 
no information about the distribution of  loss costs for specific APH yield contracts, or 
other contracts such as  CAT and revenue products. Therefore, the model simulates loss 
costs for individual insurance products by using historical yield data and price models. 
More specifically, the distributions of district-level yields are first derived from 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS)  historical yield data by using log-linear 
detrending and kernel density estimators (Goodwin and Ker, 1998; Ker and Goodwin, 
2000; Ker and Coble, 2003). The distributions of individual (farm-level) yields within 
LOSS cost is a ratio of  indemnity and associated liability. Vedenov et al.  Portfolio Allocation Under the SRA  63 
each district are then modeled by imposing a parametric distribution around district 
yield. The parameters of  the imposed distributions are calibrated so as to match the 
historical insurance experience reflected in the aggregate loss costs data. This approach 
allows us to reflect yield experience of insurance buyers, which may differ from overall 
yield experience in the district (Mason, Hayes, and Lence, 2003; Schnitkey, Sherrick, 
and Irwin, 2003). 
Once calibrated, the parameters of  individual yield distributions are assumed to 
adequately represent the variability of  within-district yields for all products included 
in the model. Loss costs for revenue products also require distributions of hamest-time 
prices, which are modeled as:5 
where p, is the harvest price, p, is the base (projected) price, y,,,  is the detrended 
national yield, ynat  is the long-term average detrended national yield, a is the elasticity 
parameter capturing correlation between national yields and prices, and z is a random 
shock that  reflects additional price variability independent of yield variability. The base 
prices are established and published by RMA  prior to the beginning of  the planting 
season, and are typically based on monthly averages of  corresponding futures prices 
(USDAIRMA, 1999). The parameters of  the random shocks z are calculated based on 
sample variance of  the national yields and implied volatilities derived from options 
contracts matching the futures contracts used to derive the base prices. 
The calibrated individual yield distributions along with the price models are used to 
simulate distributions of loss costs for all individual products included in the model. The 
simulated distributions of  loss costs for each district, crop, and insurance product are 
then combined with data on liabilities and premium rates for the base year (2001) and 
aggregated to derive distributions of realized loss ratios for each company by state and 
reinsurance fund. 
At the final stage, the shares of gains and losses presented in table 2, as  well as  data 
on base-year retention rates by company, state, and hd,  are used to calculate the distri- 
butions of the post-SRA rates of return at  various levels of aggregation. The simulation 
program can also be adjusted to output some intermediate results such as simulated 
distributions of loss ratios and portfolio allocation patterns. 
Portfolio Allocation 
General Considerations 
Assuming that the insurance companies participating in the SRA are risk averse, their 
portfolio allocation decisions should reflect the preference for lower risk exposure and 
higher expected returns. Given the structure of the SRA, these goals can be achieved by 
placing contracts with high expected loss ratios in the Assigned Risk Fund, while keeping 
those with low expected loss ratios in the Commercial Fund. Under this strategy, the 
Developmental Fund functions largely as a "spillover" fund which companies can use if 
'The price model approach was chosen over estimation ofprice distribution  from historical series,  which are  oftendistorted 
by nonstationanty, changing farm policies and support programs, inflation, etc. (Zulauf and Blue, 2003). 64  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Base-year (2001) allocation of gross premiums across 
reinsurance funds 
they reached cession limit in the Assigned Risk Fund.6 Figure 1  shows the allocation 
pattern observed in the 2001 portfolio, which generally conforms to these intuitive 
considerations. This intuition is also consistent with Ker and Ergiin's (2004)  finding that 
the policies placed in the Commercial Fund are more likely to be profitable, while those 
placed in the ARF are less likely to be profitable. 
Practical implementation of  this intuitive approach may vary from company to 
company due to differences in company size, risk attitudes, portfolio composition, and 
geographical area covered (Vedenov et al., 2004). In addition, loss ratios of  individual 
contracts interact in a nontrivial way when combined in a reinsurance fund due to 
spatial correlation of underlying yields and prices. Therefore, the expected loss ratio of 
a fund may be different from the expected loss ratios of individual contracts placed in 
the fund. The exact magnitude and direction of this aggregation effect is rather hard to 
predict, as  it  requires data on loss correlation at  the individual policy level-information 
that even insurance companies themselves may not have.7 
An  alternative approach to portfolio allocation would be to assume that insurance 
companies are  risk-neutral (as  is often done in insurance literature)  and allocate policies 
so as  to maximize the expected returns only. However, the assumption of risk neutrality 
As Ker and Ergiin (2004) point out, when companies choose to retain the minimum level (35%)  on policies placed in the 
Developmental Fund, the latter resembles the Assigned Risk Fund. 
'Since gains and losses from individual crop insurance products are  generally accepted to be positively correlated (Miranda 
and Glauber, 1997), it seems that placing together contracts with similar expected loss ratios would tend to amplify the 
aggregate loss ratios in the same direction. In other words, if all contracts with the expected loss ratios above a certain 
threshold are placed in the ARF, the expected loss ratio of the fund will tend to be even higher than the expected loss ratios 
of individual contracts. Similarly, if all contracts with the expected loss ratios below a certain threshold are placed in the 
Commercial Fund, the expected loss ratio of the fund will tend to be even lower than the expected loss ratios of individual 
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does not appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence. First, if premium rates 
were actuarially fair, a risk-neutral company would not need reinsurance at all. Even 
if the need for reinsurance were somewhat justified by distortions present in premiums 
on crop insurance products, a risk-neutral insurance company would never use the 
Assigned Risk Fund, which substantially reduces expected returns. Instead, such a 
company would concentrate all or most of  its business in the Commercial Fund. Quite 
to the contrary, the allocation patterns present in the 2001 portfolio (figure 1) reflect 
substantial use of  the ARF, and thus a certain degree of  risk aversion on the part of 
participating companies. 
Heuristic Allocation Rule 
Ideally, an optimal allocation rule can be obtained as  a solution to a multivariate optimi- 
zation problem that would determine in which fund to allocate each individual contract 
and recommend optimal retention rates  for each reinsurance fund. Solving such an 
optimization problem, however, is extremely difficult due to an enormous number of 
decision variables and nonlinearity of the objective function. Indeed, a typical company 
underwriting in Iowa may have over 15,000 contracts to allocate across funds. In addi- 
tion, retention rates need to be chosen for the Developmental and Commercial Funds. 
Adding more states increases this number even further and makes the computational 
problem practically impossible to address. 
As a more tractable approach, we suggest a simple heuristic rule that companies can 
use to allocate their books of  business. For a given district, crop, and type of  product 
(CAT, Revenue, or All Other Products), the expected loss ratio without reinsurance is 
computed based on historical data. The heuristic rule states that if the expected loss 
ratio is higher than a prespecified threshold, all the business in that district and crop 
is designated ?high risk" and placed in the Assigned Risk Fund. If the maximum cession 
limit to the Assigned Risk Fund is reached in a particular state, the appropriate Devel- 
opmental Fund is used as an overflow buffer for the remaining ?high risk" business. 
Conversely, if the expected ratio is below the threshold, all the business in the district 
and crop is allocated into the appropriate Commercial Fund. Once again, such an 
allocation strategy is consistent with empirical findings of Ker and Ergiin (2004)  as  well 
as  the allocation patterns present in the 2001 portfolio (figure 1). 
A "nalve" rule would set the threshold loss ratio at 1.0.'  However, due to the skewness 
of losses and asymmetric nature of the SRA (companies' shares of gains are higher than 
shares of losses), the expected return to companies after the SRA may be positive even 
though the expected pre-SRA loss ratio is greater than 1.0. Consider a company that 
must decide how to allocate a contract which may result in a loss ratio of  0.8 with 
probability of 0.9, and loss ratio of 4.8 with probability of 0.1. The expected pre-SRA loss 
ratio is 1.2; hence, under the "naive" heuristic rule, the policy should be placed in the 
Assigned Risk Fund. However, if the contract were placed in the Commercial Fund, its 
expected post-SRA loss ratio would be 0.929, i.e., an expected net return of 7.1%. 
Therefore, our analysis goes beyond the "naive" rule and takes into account the post- 
SRA return in determining the threshold loss ratios. For each company, portfolio alloca- 
tions are generated according to the heuristic rule for threshold values between 0.7 and 
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1.3 at  0.01 increments. The generated allocations are then used as data files for the SRA 
simulator program in order to calculate the corresponding  expected values and standard 
deviations of  the rates of  return. The "optimal" loss ratio thresholds (LR,,)  are chosen 
for each company by a simple grid search so as to maximize the expected rate of  return 
(F) while keeping the standard deviation (s) at the same or lower level (s,,,,)  achieved 
by the company under the actual base-year allocation. More formally, 
(1)  LR,,  = arg max F, 
This approach essentially maximizes expected returns on the set of  mean-variance 
pairs corresponding to various loss ratio thresholds and representing weak Pareto- 
improvements  over the base-year allocation in the mean-variance space. While loss ratio 
thresholds determined in this way may be somewhat conservative, the advantage of this 
approach is that it does not require any assumptions about specific risk preferences of 
individual companies, other than risk aversion. 
For practical implementation of  the above algorithm, all district/crop/product type 
combinations within each state were sorted in the decreasing order of  the expected 
pre-SRA loss ratios and placed in the Assigned Risk Fund in that order. This was done 
to ensure that the districts with higher loss ratios go  into the ARF first in case the 
maximum cession limit is reached in a particular state  and the Developmental Fund has 
to be used as an overflow. 
For simplicity, retention rates across all companies and states were fxed at 100%  for 
the Commercial Fund and 35% for the Developmental Fund. For the Commercial Fund, 
this assumption is consistent with the actual retention elections observed in the 2001 
portfolio, where 2,768 out of  2,850 retention rates (or 97.1%)  were set to loo%.' For the 
Developmental Fund, the actual 2001 retention elections  were generally  higher than the 
minimum 35%. However, these retention elections were made based on actual policies 
placed in the Developmental Fund and may not necessarily reflect retention rates the 
companies would elect if allocating according to the suggested heuristic rule. Therefore, 
we assumed conservative retention rates which are consistent with the intuition behind 
the suggested heuristic allocation rule (i.e., that the Developmental Fund is used as an 
extension of  the Assigned Risk Fund). Finally, for the Assigned Risk Fund, the retention 
rates were set to the required 20% for all states under the 1998 SRA (just as in the actual 
2001 portfolio) and to the state-specific levels (15%,  20%, or 25%)  under the 2005 SRA. 
Validation 
In order to evaluate efficiency of  the suggested heuristic rule in allocating portfolios of 
insurance contracts among reinsurance funds, we  compared the returns generated by 
the SRA simulation program using the actual 2001 allocation data and the heuristic 
allocations based on the "optimal" loss ratio thresholds as defined in (1). 
Presented in table 3 are the simulated post-SRA rates of  return for the actual (2001) 
and heuristic allocations under the 1998 SRA. The table also reports the loss ratio 
The number 2,850 represents the total number of company-state  combinations present in either one ofthree Commercial 
Funds in the base-year portfolio. & 
Table 3. Comparison of Actual (2001) and Heuristic Allocations Under the 1998 SRA  !? 
0 
Actual Allocation  Heuristic Allocation  Difference in Premium Allocations  2. 
95% Confidence Interval  R  Expected  Loss  Expected  Develop-  Commer- 
Rate of  Standard  Ratio  Rate of  Lower  Upper  Standard  mental  cial  % 
Company  Return  Deviation  Threshold  Return  Bound  Bound  Deviation  ARF  Fund  Fund  Retained 
#1  3.3%  9.1%  1.01  5.7%  4.8%  6.0%  7.5%  7.2%  1.9%  -9.2%  -8.9% 
#2  5.4%  10.3%  0.94  6.2%  5.5%  6.7%  7.2%  24.5%  -26.4%  1.9%  -26.5% 
#3  6.1%  13.2%  1.14  11.1%  9.9%  12.1%  13.1%  4.5%  -9.1%  4.7%  - 1.2% 
#4  6.6%  10.9%  1.06  9.3%  8.1%  9.8%  10.9%  9.1%  -19.3%  10.2%  -9.4% 
#5  6.7%  10.7%  1.11  9.9%  8.8%  10.5%  10.6%  -8.2%  -5.8%  14.0%  0.7% 
#6  6.9%  15.0%  1.14  9.3%  7.8%  10.0%  14.9%  3.1%  -15.3%  12.2%  -2.4% 
#7  7.5%  10.7%  1.01  10.8%  9.7%  11.3%  10.6%  1.6%  -9.3%  7.7%  0.8% 
#8  8.7%  24.2%  1.08  9.9%  8.2%  11.5%  24.0%  1.1%  - 1.5%  0.4%  -0.2% 
#9  9.2%  15.8%  1.19  12.0%  10.6%  12.8%  14.0%  5.1%  -5.8%  0.7%  -  6.4% 
#10  9.5%  14.3%  1.17  12.0%  10.7%  13.0%  13.7%  0.6%  -13.3%  12.7%  -2.3% 
#11  10.1%  13.8%  1.06  13.3%  11.9%  14.0%  13.7%  -8.6%  -  1.4%  10.0%  6.6% 
#12  11.0%  18.2%  1.05  12.4%  11.0%  14.3%  18.1%  12.8%  -22.2%  9.4%  -14.9% 
#13  11.2%  17.4%  1.07  13.7%  12.3%  15.1%  17.4%  1.1%  -13.3%  12.1%  -5.0% 
#14  14.4%  17.5%  0.96  17.1%  15.6%  18.5%  17.4%  -0.2%  1.8%  -1.6%  1.9%  2' 
#15  15.0%  19.9%  1.04  17.0%  15.3%  18.5%  19.6%  2.3%  -13.8%  11.5%  -3.4%  $ 
#16  18.7%  27.7%  1.03  21.0%  19.2%  23.3%  26.8%  2.3%  -7.7%  5.4%  -2.0%  2  0 
#17  19.4%  25.4%  1.04  19.7%  17.6%  20.8%  24.8%  0.9%  0.0%  -0.9%  -0.7%  b 
2  0 
#18  19.8%  35.5%  1.08  21.0%  19.0%  24.9%  37.2%  4.8%  -20.1%  15.3%  -3.9% 
C) 
#19  $. 
20.2%  32.9%  1.17  21.9%  20.1%  25.1%  30.8%  6.7%  -14.9%  8.2%  -6.8%  3 
All  9.6%  14.0%  N/A  12.5%  11.1%  13.3%  13.4%  0.5%  -8.8%  8.3%  -2.0%  F 
% 
Y 
Notes: Returns are expressed as  percentages of gross premiums. Lower and upper bounds of the confidence interval are computed as 2.5%  and 97.5%  percentiles ofjackknife distribution 
-A  2~ 
of the expected returns. Differences in premium allocations are calculated as percentages of gross premiums placed in a corresponding fund or retained under heuristic allocation less  m 
the same percentage under the actual 2001 allocation. Companies' identities are replaced by scrambled identifiers due to  the proprietary nature of data used in the analysis.  E 68  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
thresholds "optimal" in the sense of (1)  and differences in portfolio allocation patterns 
between the actual and heuristic allocations. Results are reported for the 19 companies 
reinsured by FCIC in 2001. Due to the proprietary nature of some data used in the SRA 
simulator program, the individual companies are represented in this and subsequent 
tables by scrambled identifiers, and all results are expressed as percentages of  gross 
premiums rather than dollar amounts. The gross premiums are not affected by a partic- 
ular allocation method, and thus provide a convenient basis for relative comparison. 
The results indicate that the suggested heuristic rule works at least as well, if not 
better than, the allocation strategies utilized by  companies in 2001. The expected 
returns of  all companies under the heuristic rule are higher than those obtained under 
the actual allocation, while the variability of  returns is lower for all but one company. 
To further validate the results, 95% confidence intervals for the expected returns are 
computed for the heuristic allocation by using the  jackknife approach (Efron, 1982).  For 
15 companies, the improvement in expected returns is significant at  the 95% confidence 
level. For the other four companies, the lower bound of  the 95% confidence interval is 
only slightly below the expected returns under the actual allocation. The difference in 
returns is primarily explained by heavier use of  the Commercial and Assigned Risk 
Funds under the heuristic allocation at the expense of  the Developmental Fund. The 
difference in percentages of  retained premiums is explained by  fairly conservative 
assumptions about retention rates underlying the heuristic rule. 
Note that the seemingly superior performance of the suggested heuristic rule must 
be interpreted somewhat cautiously. The rule makes several simplifying assumptions, 
such as  f~ng  retention rates at  the same level for all companies and states, treating all 
business for a given district and crop as a single allocation unit, using the expected loss 
ratios for the whole district regardless of product composition, setting a single threshold 
for expected loss ratios for the whole company, and so on. In addition, the rule com- 
pletely ignores correlation in losses or gains that may exist between contracts written 
in adjacent districts or for different crops within the same district. 
However, we would like to emphasize that our purpose is not to suggest a better 
strategy to allocate crop insurance policies so as  to extract the maximum profit from the 
SRA (a topic, no doubt, of great interest to participating companies). Rather, we seek to 
hd  an allocation rule that would reasonably replicate portfolio performance for a known 
portfolio allocation in the hope it  will do equally well in simulating portfolio performance 
in a situation for which actual allocation is unknown-such  as the 2005 SRA. From this 
standpoint, the results in table 3 suggest that the heuristic allocation rule does a fairly 
good job  in approximating companies' allocation strategies, and thus can be used to 
imitate companies' reaction to the changed structure of the 2005 SRA. 
2005 SRA versus 1998 SRA 
We now attempt to analyze the changes in allocation patterns and rates of return that 
may be caused by introduction of the new SRA. Recall that the main difference between 
the 1998 SRA and 2005 SRA is in the cession limits and retention requirements for the 
Assigned Risk Fund (table 1)  and the introduction of the "retained net book quota share" 
form of  reinsurance, which essentially decreases overall net gains and losses by  an 
additional 5%. The parameters of  Commercial and Developmental Funds, as well as 
shares of  gains and losses under the nonproportional reinsurance, are the same under 
both versions of the agreement. Vedenov et al.  Portfolio Allocation Under the SRA  69 
Table 4. Changes in Post-SRA Returns and Portfolio Allocation by Company: 
2005 SRA versus 1998 SRA 
Portfolio Returns  Allocation of Gross Premiums 
Expected  % in 
Loss Ratio  Rate of  Standard  % in  Develop-  % in  % 
Company  Threshold  Return  Deviation  ARF  mental  Commercial  Retained 
All  NIA  -0.5%  NIA  0.9%  -4.0%  3.1%  1.4% 
Note: The results reported here are presented as changes from the 1998 SRA  (table 3) to the 2005 SRA. 
Since no data on actual allocations under the 2005 SRA were available at the time 
this research was conducted, the heuristic allocation rule described in the previous 
section was applied to the 2001  book of business. Specifically,  we attempted to replicate 
portfolio allocation patterns that might have arisen if  the participating  companies 
allocated their 2001 portfolios under the provisions of  the 2005 SRA. The generated 
portfolio allocation was then used as an input for the SRA simulation program in order 
to calculate expected rates of return and their variability. The results of the simulation 
in terms of  differences from the baseline levels of the 1998  SRA are presented in table 
4. lo 
Table 4 suggests the 2005 SRA will result in rather minor changes relative to the 
1998  SRA. All companies will experience a slight decrease in expected rates of returns 
(between -0.02%  and -1.1%). At the same time, the  variability of returns will also slightly 
decrease for all but three companies. Given relatively minor differences in provisions 
of the 1998  and 2005  SRAs, the most probable explanation for these changes appears 
to be the "retained net book quota share" reinsurance. Recall that this new provision 
lo  For adequate comparison, the results obtained under heuristic rather than actual allocation are used as the 1998 
baseline. 70  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
decreases by an additional 5% the net gains and losses realized after proportional and 
nonproportional  provisions of  SRA are applied. Since the expected net returns are 
positive for all companies (table 3), the companies on average stand to lose 5% of gains 
more often than to have 5% of losses compensated, which results in a negative net effect 
on the expected return. The "retained net book quota share" reinsurance also tightens 
the distribution of returns around 0%,  which explains the decrease in variance observed 
in table 4. 
In terms of portfolio allocation, reactions of companies to the 2005 SRA seem to 
exhibit three distinct patterns. One group of companies (#I, #2, #4, #6, #8, #9, and #19) 
would use the same loss ratio thresholds for allocation decisions, and only reallocate 
portions of the business from the Developmental to the Assigned Risk Fund. Since the 
Developmental Fund is used as an overflow for the ARF under the heuristic allocation 
rule, these companies appear to underwrite in states with a higher proportion of risky 
business and would benefit from increased cession limits in those states (table 1). 
The second group of companies (#3, #5, #7, #lo, and #14) would also reallocate part 
of their business from the Developmental Fund to ARF, but at the same time increase 
their allocation to the Commercial Fund (also at the expense of  the Developmental 
Fund). This behavior can be explained as a combination of two factors. First, increased 
cession limits under the 2005 SRA allow the companies to allocate more business to the 
ARF in some states. Second, the companies attempt to counteract the decrease in net 
gains caused by the "retained net book quota share" reinsurance by recapturing a higher 
portion of the gains in the Commercial Fund. 
Finally, the remaining seven companies (#11-#13 and #15-#18) would increase their 
allocations in the Commercial Fund by reallocating business from both the Develop- 
mental Fund and the ARF. These companies seem to underwrite in states where cession 
limits to the ARF were not binding under the 1998 SRA. Changes in their allocation 
patterns are explained solely by the reaction to the "retained net book quota share" 
reinsurance. 
To further analyze the effect of changes in cession limits and retention requirements, 
the changes in allocation patterns between the 1998 and 2005 SRAs aggregated at the 
state level are presented in table 5 for the top 25 states in terms of 2001 gross 
premiums. The results once again suggest that the major driving force behind changes 
in portfolio allocations is the introduction of "retained net book quota share" reinsurance 
rather than changes in provisions of  the ARF. While the cession limits to the ARF 
increased under the 2005 SRA in 17 out of  25 states, the proportions of  premiums 
allocated to the ARF under the 2005 SRA increased only in six states (Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Kansas, Missouri, South Dakota, and Tennessee). In two states where the 
cession limits under the 2005 SRA remained the same (Arkansas and Montana), the 
proportions of  gross premiums in ARF also remain the same. In all other states, the 
proportions of gross premiums in ARF actually decrease. At the same time, the propor- 
tions of  premiums in the Commercial Fund increase in all 25 states with additional 
premiums reallocated from the Developmental andlor Assigned Risk Fund. Changes in 
retention requirements do  not appear to have any consistent  effect  on  changes in 
allocation patterns. Vedenov et al.  Portfolio Allocation Under the SRA  7 1 
Table 5. Changes in Portfolio Allocation Patterns for Selected States: 2005 
SRA versus 1998 SRA 
Change in: 
Required  % Gross  % Gross 
Gross  Cession  Retention  Premiums in  Premiums in  % Gross 
Premium  Limit  Rate  Commercial  Developmental  Premiums 


























All States  2,283.84  NIA  NIA  3.1%  -4.0%  1.0% 
Notes: The table includes the top 25  states in terms of gross premiums (95.9%  of all premiums included in the model). The 
states are ordered by percentage changes of gross premiums in ARF  (the last column).  The results in columns 3 through 
7 are changes from the 1998  SRA  to the 2005 SRA. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined how insurance companies participating in delivery of  crop 
insurance would react to the introduction of the 2005 Standard Reinsurance Agreement. 
The analysis concentrates on changes in portfolio allocation patterns across reinsurance 
funds that may be caused by the new SRA. 
The rates of return of insurance companies under the SRA are calculated using an 
SRA simulation model based on historical data on loss costs and yields. In order to 
imitate portfolio allocation strategies of participating companies, a simple heuristic 
allocation rule is introduced. The rule, while not an optimal allocation strategy in the 72  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
strict sense, allows for variations in risk attitudes among companies and also takes into 
account the effect of the SRA on net returns. Comparison of  returns calculated under 
the actual base year (2001) allocation and an allocation implied by the heuristic rule 
suggests the rule works fairly well as a proxy to the actual companies' behavior, and 
thus can be utilized to model their reaction to changes in the SRA. 
The heuristic rule is then applied to construct portfolio allocations that reflect 
changes in the 2005 SRA. The allocation patterns along with portfolio returns are 
analyzed at  the individual company and state levels. The main conclusion of  the 
analysis is that the bulk of changes in portfolio allocations are likely to be caused by the 
introduction of "retained net book quota share" reinsurance rather than adjustments in 
cession limits and retention requirements for the Assigned Risk Fund. While seven 
companies do increase the proportion of gross premiums placed in the ARF, the other 
12 reallocate gross premiums from the Developmental andlor Assigned Risk Fund into 
the Commercial Fund. The "retained net book quota share" reinsurance requires 
companies to cede to the FCIC 5% of  gains or losses realized after all other provisions 
of the SRA are applied. Since the expected returns after all other provisions of SRA are 
positive for all companies, the companies on average stand to cede 5% of  their gains 
more often than 5%  of their losses. Thus the  "retained net book quota share" reinsurance 
tends to decrease the expected returns, and companies attempt to counteract this effect 
by allocating more of gross premiums into the Commercial Fund, where they can keep 
higher shares of underwriting gains. At the state level, increases in cession limits result 
in a higher proportion of gross premiums placed in the ARF in only six out of 25 states 
reported. At the same time, the proportion of premiums placed in the Commercial Fund 
increases in all states. 
The effect of changes in the 2005 SRA on portfolio returns appears to be rather minor. 
The expected returns of  all companies decrease by less than 1.1%,  suggesting the 
companies should be able to mitigate the effect of "retained net book quota share" 
reinsurance to some degree. 
[Received June 2004;Jinal revision received January 2006.1 
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